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Introduction
The current sanctuary-city debate swept across the United States
after a 32-year-old woman died in her father’s arms when an undocumented immigrant shot her. The undocumented immigrant was
previously in the San Francisco Police Department’s custody, but the
Department released him based on its sanctuary-city policy, despite federal immigration authorities’ objections. Naturally, Americans began
asking, “Do sanctuary cities make us safer? Or does law enforcement’s
compliance with ICE detainers make us safer?” Texas, believing cities
should do the latter, enacted Senate Bill 4, banning sanctuary cities and
fueling the fire of the already heated sanctuary-city debate. But police
officers—whose behavior SB4 affects—are caught in the middle of the
politics and legal arguments, making their opinions extremely relevant.
For this Article, the Author interviewed six local law enforcement
agencies in Texas regarding SB4.1 Based on those interviews and other research, this Article concludes that SB4 likely does not uproot and
change Texas policing practices and asserts that SB4 may in fact be highly ineffective at improving resident safety, which was Texas lawmakers’
stated purpose for SB4. SB4 continues to have far reaching impacts,
including concerns of racial profiling, victims and witnesses refusing to
come forward due to fears of deportation, and damage to police officers’
reputations. Further, while some local law enforcement agencies claim
they will not have to reallocate their resources to comply with SB4’s
requirements, they have had to expend extra resources on community
outreach due to the fear SB4 has caused.
The officers interviewed for this Article assert that, since SB4’s
enactment, officers are not stopping individuals based on their race or
ethnicity, and they are not inquiring into peoples’ immigration statuses
more frequently. Due to SB4’s recent enactment and the lack of data,
however, the accuracy of those statements likely cannot be confirmed
until SB4 is implemented in practice. But the fact that some agencies are
not reallocating their resources may provide evidence that officers are
making decisions with other facts in mind besides race and documentation status.
1
The author reached out to dozens of local law enforcement agencies in Texas. Unfortunately, most agencies either did not respond to the interview requests or declined to comment.
Further, the law enforcement officers’ names have been changed in this Comment.
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Further, most Texas detention facilities were cooperating with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) long before the current
sanctuary-city debate began. Thus, the officers claim that SB4 will not
impact their daily operations. Considering that fact, in addition to the
lack of resource reallocation, leads to the question of why Texas lawmakers bothered to enact SB4 in the first place. To answer that question,
it is important to first understand the history of sanctuary cities, the
events leading to SB4’s enactment, SB4’s requirements, and similar state
legislation.
I.

Background on SB4
A. History of Sanctuary Cities in the United States

Sanctuary is defined as a “safe place, esp[ecially] where legal process cannot be executed” or as a “holy area of a religious building.”2
This concept can be traced back to biblical times,3 when the sanctuary
responsibility belonged to churches, “which offered places of refuge for
those accused of crimes and were susceptible to revengeful attacks by
their victims.”4
Throughout history, churches and monasteries provided sanctuary
to various groups seeking safety. For example, churches played a large
role in the Underground Railroad, providing refuge for people escaping
slavery.5 During World War II, monasteries provided refuge to Jewish
people fleeing the holocaust.6 Churches also gave refuge to civil rights
workers seeking to enforce the United States Supreme Court’s 1954
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education and to draft resisters during the
Vietnam War.7
Sanctuary, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
See, e.g., Sophie H. Pirie, The Origins of a Political Trial: The Sanctuary Movement and
Political Justice, 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 381, 389 (2013) (explaining that “Biblical sanctuaries offered respite, not merely from the procedures of local custom or law, but also from its norms”);
Clyde Haberman, Trump and the Battle over Sanctuary in America, N.Y. Times (Mar. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/us/sanctuary-cities-movement-1980s-political-asylum.
html (referring to Deuteronomy and the Book of Joshua as examples of sanctuary); Ann Deslandes, Sanctuary Cities Are as Old as the Bible, JSTOR Daily (Mar. 22, 2017), https://daily.
jstor.org/sanctuary-cities-as-old-as-bible (“The Bible, at Joshua 20:2, states ‘tell the Israelites
to designate the cities of refuge.’”).
4
Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. Rev. 133, 139 (2008).
5
See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury—A Government’s
Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 5, 41–42 (1986).
6
Id. at 42.
7
Id. at 42–43.
2
3
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People first used the term sanctuary in the immigration context
during the 1980s Sanctuary Movement.8 The term referred to churches’
and cities’ efforts to assist Salvadoran and Guatemalan people applying
for asylum in the United States.9 At first, the federal government took
a hands-off approach to the Sanctuary Movement.10 But by mid-1984,
150 churches nationwide had declared sanctuary and 18 national religious denominations and commissions endorsed the movement.11 The
government, “which had apparently hoped that the movement would be
short-lived,” then changed its approach and began arresting and prosecuting multiple sanctuary workers for conspiring to violate immigration
laws.12 Instead of deterring sanctuaries—as the government likely
planned—the prosecutions inspired more churches and synagogues to
join the sanctuary efforts.13
In response to the federal government rejecting the Salvadorans’
and Guatemalans’ asylum claims, states and cities enacted their own
laws providing safeguards to immigrants.14 The most controversial safeguard provided assurance that police officers would not cooperate with
federal immigration enforcement.15 Eventually, however, the Sanctuary
Movement died down when Congress amended the Immigration and
Villazor, supra note 4, at 134–35; Deslandes, supra note 3.
See Villazor, supra note 4, at 139–142; Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Nora Hamilton & James
Loucky, The Sanctuary Movement and Central American Activism in Los Angeles, 36 Latin
Am. Persp. 101, 102 (2009).
10
See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 5, at 43 (revealing that the U.S. government initially did
not consider the sanctuary movement a threat, and declined to prosecute sanctuary workers
despite their openly stated intent to violate immigration law); Pirie, supra note 3, at 407 (“It is
perhaps not surprising that the government, and the INS in particular, ‘poohpoohed sanctuary
for two years as an irrelevant gesture . . . that had a marginal impact at most on the INS task
of protecting the nation’s borders and that would disappear when the novelty wore off.’”)
(quoting Gary MacEoin, A Brief History of the Sanctuary Movement, in Sanctuary: A Resource Guide for Understanding and Participating in the Central American Refugees’
Struggle 14, 23 (Gary MacEoin ed., 1985)).
11
Chinchilla, Hamilton & Loucky, supra note 9, at 107.
12
Id.; see also Colbert, supra note 5, at 44–45.
13
Colbert, supra note 5, at 47; Chinchilla, Hamilton, & Loucky, supra note 9, at 107.
14
Villazor, supra note 4, at 142; Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1373, 1383 (2006).
15
See Villazor, supra note 4, at 142–43 (describing the safeguard as “a type of ‘don’t ask,
don’t tell’ policy”); Pham, supra note 14, at 1383–84 (describing a typical sanctuary law in Takoma Park, Maryland, which prohibited its employees from assisting INS with investigations
of immigration violations.).
8
9
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Nationality Act (INA) in 1997, making the Salvadoran and Guatemalan
asylum seekers eligible for special refugee status.16
Although the executive branch openly criticized the sanctuary
laws, it never sued the States to challenge the laws.17 Instead, Congress
sought States’ cooperation by enacting INA § 287(g) in 1996.18 But
by the time § 287(g) was actually implemented in 2002 (following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack),19 the Sanctuary Movement had
already died down.20
Section 287(g)—still in effect today—authorizes ICE to delegate
immigration enforcement authority to local law enforcement agencies
under an agreement that requires training and supervision by ICE officers.21 Once deputized under the agreement, local law enforcement
officers have the same power as immigration officials “to interrogate
any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to
remain in the United States.”22 As of February 2018, ICE has § 287(g)
agreements with 78 law enforcement agencies, 26 of which are in Texas.23
Critics argue that § 287(g) agreements cause racial profiling, community
policing problems, and negative local economy impacts.24
Before discussing the federal government’s second attempt at state
cooperation, it is important to understand the concept of an ICE detainer. A detainer is a “notice that ICE issues to federal, state, local, or tribal
[law enforcement agencies] to inform the [agencies] that ICE intends to
assume custody of a removable alien in the [agencies’] custody.”25 As of
See Villazor, supra note 4, at 142 n.58.
Pham, supra note 14, at 1384.
18
Id.
19
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship 1215 (8th ed. 2016).
20
See Villazor, supra note 4, at 142 n.58 (“In 1997, Congress passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193–2201
(1997) . . . , which enabled some immigrants from El Salvador and Guatemala to apply for
cancellation of their removal.”); Pham, supra note 14, at 1385.
21
Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act,
U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enforcement (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/287g [hereinafter Delegation of Immigration Authority].
22
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2000).
23
Delegation of Immigration Authority, supra note 21.
24
Jason G. Idilbi, Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law: Should North Carolina
Communities Implement 287(g) Authority, 86 N.C.L. Rev. 1710, 1712–13 (2008).
25
U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, Policy No. 10074.2: Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers § 3.1 (2017). SB4 defines an “immigration detainer request” as “a federal government request to a local entity to maintain temporary custody of an
alien, including a United States Department of Homeland Security Form I-247 document or a
16
17
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2015, detainer requests notify the agency that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “has determined that probable cause exists that the
[inmate] is a removable alien.”26 The detainer request also asks the agency to (1) notify DHS as soon as practicable prior to the inmate’s release;
and (2) maintain custody of the inmate for up to 48 hours beyond the
preexisting release date to allow DHS to assume custody of the inmate.27
In 2008, ICE introduced Secure Communities, another cooperation program designed to identify criminal undocumented immigrants
in another law enforcement agency’s custody.28 Traditionally, local law
enforcement agencies fingerprint the people in their custody and send
that information to the FBI.29 “Under Secure Communities, the FBI
automatically sends the fingerprints to ICE.”30 If ICE finds a match, it
issues a detainer “[i]n most cases,” although it is not automatic.31
Secure Communities was heavily criticized for targeting undocumented immigrants that were not dangerous criminals and for reducing
immigrants’ trust in local law enforcement.32 In 2010, states began notifying ICE that they wanted to opt out of Secure Communities, but ICE
announced that opting out was not possible.33 In response, some states
found their own way to opt out—decline ICE detainer requests.34 By
June 2011, however, 47 percent of jurisdictions were participating in the
program, “and DHS [was] on track to expand the program to all [local
similar or successor form.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 772.0073(a)(2) (West 2017).
26
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration Detainer—Notice of Action, DHS Form
I-247A 1 (2017) [hereinafter Immigration Detainer]. Prior to 2015, ICE detainer requests did
not state the existence of probable cause. Legal Issues with Immigration Detainers, Immigr.
Legal Resource Ctr. 2 (Nov. 2016), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/detainer_law_memo_november_2016_updated.pdf.
27
Immigration Detainer, supra note 26, at 1.
28
Secure Communities, U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enforcement (Mar. 20, 2018), https://
www.ice.gov/secure-communities.
29
Aleinikoff et al., supra note 19, at 1217; Lindsey J. Gill, Secure Communities: Burdening Local Law Enforcement and Undermining the U Visa, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2055, 2059
(2013).
30
Gill, supra note 29, at 2059; see also David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement is Not Just
for Restrictionists: Building a Stable and Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L. &
Pol. 441 (2015).
31
Number of ICE Detainers Drops by 19 Percent, TRAC Immigr. (Jan. 2013), http://trac.syr.
edu/immigration/reports/325.
32
See Gill, supra note 29, at 2062–63; Rachel R. Ray, Insecure Communities: Examining
Local Government Participation in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s “Secure Communities” Program, 10 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 327, 337–38 (2011).
33
Martin, supra note 30, at 449–50.
34
Id. at 450.
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law enforcement agencies] across the country by 2013.”35 But beginning
in 2013, “the detainer-resistance snowball truly gained momentum.”36
Realizing the need for substantial changes to Secure Communities for
local law enforcement agencies to voluntarily cooperate again, DHS discontinued the program in 2014.37 But in 2017, the Trump administration
revived the program, claiming that “Secure Communities had a long and
successful history prior to its [2014] suspension.”38 Collectively during
these two periods, “Secure Communities [has] interoperability led to the
removal of over 363,400 criminal aliens from the U.S.”39
The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) is another federal-state cooperation program that generally receives less public attention than the other
programs.40 CAP aims to identify “allegedly removable noncitizens who
are incarcerated in jails and prisons” and to initiate removal proceedings.41 In addition to identifying undocumented immigrants, CAP also
identifies lawful permanent residents and other lawfully present nonimmigrants.42 CAP is implemented in all federal and state prisons, along
with 300 local jails nationwide.43 In Fiscal Year 2011, CAP resulted in
221,122 arrests by ICE.44
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) March 2018 lawsuit against
California demonstrates the tensions surrounding state and federal
cooperation under the Trump Administration. In 2017, California passed
three statutes that limited cooperation with federal immigration officials.45 The DOJ argues that the laws “have the purpose and effect of
Ray, supra note 32, at 337.
Martin, supra note 30, at 451.
37
Id. at 453.
38
Secure Communities, supra note 28.
39
Id.
40
The Criminal Alien Program (CAP): Immigration Enforcement in Prisons and Jails, Am.
Immigr. Council (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/criminal-alien-program-cap-immigration-enforcement-prisons-and-jails.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See Complaint at 2, United States v. California, No. 18–264 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018).
The first statute, the “Immigrant Worker Protection Act,” Assembly Bill
450 . . . , prohibits private employers in California from voluntarily cooperating with federal officials who seek information relevant to immigration enforcement that occurs in places of employment.
The second statute, Assembly Bill 103 . . . , creates an inspection and review
scheme that requires the Attorney General of California to investigate the
35
36
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making it more difficult” to enforce immigration law, making the laws
unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.46 At
the time of this writing, the litigation is still pending.
B. Events Leading to SB4’s Enactment

Once again, in 2018, the term sanctuary—used in terms of a sanctuary city—is at the forefront of immigration debates. Sanctuary city
does not have one precise definition or any specific legal meaning. But
all the various definitions agree on one thing: a sanctuary city is a city
that limits its cooperation with federal immigration authorities,47 which
often includes declining ICE detainer requests. But unlike during the
1980s, when the term sanctuary represented ethical and moral obligations, today the term carries a negative connotation.48
The current sanctuary-cities debate started in 2015 when an undocumented immigrant, Jose Ines Garcia Zarate, shot and killed Katie
Steinle.49 Prior to her death, Garcia Zarate was in the San Francisimmigration enforcement efforts of federal agents.
The third statute, Senate Bill 54 . . . , which includes the “California Values
Act, limits the ability of state and local law enforcement officers to provide
the United States with basic information about individuals who are in their
custody and are subject to federal immigration custody, or to transfer such
individuals to federal immigration custody. Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded?, CNN (last
updated Mar. 26, 2018, 3:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-cities-explained/index.html (“The term ‘sanctuary city’ is a broad term applied to jurisdictions that
have policies in place designed to limit cooperation with or involvement in federal immigration
enforcement actions.”); Kaitlyn Schallhorn, Sanctuary Cities: What Are They?, Fox News (Mar.
22, 2018) http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/10/09/sanctuary-cities-what-are.html, (“While
the exact specifications can vary, sanctuary city policies overall limit just how much local law
enforcement officials cooperate with federal immigration authorities.”); Van Le, Immigration
101: What is a Sanctuary City?, America’s Voice (Apr. 25, 2017), https://americasvoice.org/blog/
what-is-a-sanctuary-city (“There’s no single definition of . . . a sanctuary city, but generally
speaking, it’s a city (or a county) that limits its cooperation with federal immigration enforcement agents in order to protect low-priority immigrants from deportation.”).
48
Lansing, Michigan Rescinds ‘Sanctuary’ Status After Criticism from Businesses, Fox
News (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/04/13/lansing-michigan-rescinds-sanctuary-status-after-criticism-from-businesses.html (According to Councilwoman Judi Brown
Clarke, the term sanctuary city “has its own negative connotation . . . . The only way to take
that away is to take that word away.”); Sophie Quinton, Controversy over “Sanctuary” Campuses is Misleading, Legal Analysts Say, PBS (Dec. 17, 2016, 2:22 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/sanctuary-campus-controversial (stating that the word sanctuary has a “negative
connotation” for some people); Villazor, supra note 4, at 135 (“Similar to the word ‘amnesty,’
sanctuary has acquired a tainted meaning.”).
49
See Katie Steinle Case that led to Debate over US Sanctuary Cities, Trump’s Call for Wall
46
47
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co Police Department’s custody. ICE sent the department a detainer
request, asking the department to hold Garcia Zarate until ICE officials
could take him into custody. The department, however, released Garcia Zarate due to its sanctuary-city policy, which prohibited the sheriff
from cooperating with ICE detainers.50 After Garcia Zarate’s release
and Steinle’s death, Texas started focusing on sanctuary cities.51
In the following months, Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez
announced that she would only honor ICE detainers on a case-by-case
basis.52 Shortly thereafter, in October 2015, Texas Governor Greg Abbott
sent Sheriff Valdez a letter stating that sanctuary-city policies would “no
longer be tolerated in Texas.”53 Citing the San Francisco Police Department’s release of Garcia Zarate, Abbott stated: “It is unacceptable for a
Texas Sheriff to take a similarly dangerous path by departing from the
strictest ICE standards.”54
About a year later, Senator Charles Perry filed Senate Bill 4 (SB4)
in the Texas Legislature, and it was introduced in the Senate in late January 2017.55 That same month, Governor Abbott gave his State of the
State Address, declaring the sanctuary-cities ban among his list of four
emergency items for legislative action.56 He stated:
It is our burden to deal with the consequences of the federal
government not securing the border. Let’s be clear: We all
support legal immigration; it’s what built America. What must
is Under Way in Court, Fox News (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/10/23/katesteinle-case-that-led-to-debate-over-us-sanctuary-cities-trump-s-call-for-wall-is-underway-incourt.html; Brief for Appellants at 2, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, (No. 17–50762) (5th Cir. Sept.
28, 2017).
50
See Daniel Arkin, Kathryn Steinle Killing: San Francisco Defends ‘Sanctuary City’ Status
Amid Criticism, NBC News (Dec. 2, 2017, 7:53 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
kathryn-steinle-killing-san-francisco-defends-sanctuary-city-status-amid-n825836.
51
Brief for Appellants, supra note 49, at 3.
52
Jay Root, Abbott Hits Dallas over “Sanctuary” Policies, Tex. Trib. (Oct. 26, 2015, 11:00
AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/10/26/abbott-hits-dallas-over-sanctuary-policies.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Texas Senate Bill 4, LegiScan (last visited Dec. 5, 2017), https://legiscan.com/TX/drafts/
SB4/2017.
56
Press Release, Office of the Texas Governor, Governor Abbott Delivers State of the
State Address (Jan. 31, 2017), https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor_abbott_delivers_state_
of_the_state_address. The other three emergency items included fixing Texas’s Child Protective Services agency, reforming ethics laws, and supporting an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to rein in federal power. Id.
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be stopped is illegal immigration—and worse, the criminals
who conspire with cartels to enter the United States illegally.57
That same month, Governor Abbott sent a letter to Travis County
Sheriff Sally Hernandez regarding her sanctuary-city policy, “strongly
urg[ing] [her] to reverse [the] policy before its effective date.58 Texas lawmakers were concerned because the Sheriff’s policy “picked the crimes
of detention that the Sheriff deemed serious enough to require officers
to comply with ICE-detainer requests.”59 Those crimes, however, did not
include rape or child pedophilia.60 Sheriff Hernandez did not reverse
the policy before its February 1, 2017 effective date. Governor Abbott
deemed this “offensive”61 and tweeted, “Texas will hammer Travis County.”62 Governor Abbott then cut about $1.5 million of Travis County’s
state grant funds.63
In February 2017, SB4 passed in the Senate, with 20 yeas and 10
64
nays. Almost three months later, the House passed SB4, with 94 yeas
and 53 nays.65 On May 7, 2017, Governor Abbott signed SB4, stating:
There are deadly consequences to not enforcing the law, and
Texas has now become a state where those practices are not
tolerated. With this bill we are doing away with those that
seek to promote lawlessness in Texas.66
Also, according to Governor Abbott, SB4 promotes public safety—
his top priority.67
Id.
Letter from Greg Abbott, Governor, Texas, to Sally Hernandez, Sheriff, Travis County (Jan. 23, 2017), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/TravisCountySheriffSanctuaryCity_01232017.pdf.
59
Brief for Appellants, supra note 49, at 3.
60
Id.
61
Andrew Eicher, Texas Gov. Abbott on Levin: ‘I’m Putting the Hammer Down’ on Sanctuary Cities, CNSNews (Feb. 6, 2017, 2:32 PM), https://www.cnsnews.com/blog/andrew-eicher/
texas-gov-abbot-levin-im-putting-hammer-down-sanctuary-cities.
62
Greg Abbott (@GregAbbott_TX), Twitter (Feb. 2, 2017, 2:24 PM), https://twitter.com/
gregabbott_tx/status/827281587381231616?lang=en.
63
Eicher, supra note 61.
64
S. Journal, 85th Legis., Regular Sess. 6 (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.journals.senate.state.
tx.us/sjrnl/85r/pdf/85RSJ02-08-F.PDF.
65
H. Journal, 85th Legis., Regular Sess. 7 (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.journals.house.state.
tx.us/hjrnl/85r/pdf/85RDAY58FINAL.PDF.
66
Texas Bans Sanctuary Cities, Office of the Tex. Governor (May 7, 2017), https://gov.
texas.gov/news/post/Texas-Bans-Sanctuary-Cities.
67
Id.
57
58
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Ken Paxton, Texas’s attorney general, immediately filed a preemptive lawsuit seeking a declaration that SB4 was constitutional.68
Dismissing the lawsuit, the federal judge stated that he would not engage
in a “hypothetical legal question.”69 But less than a week after Paxton
filed his preemptive suit, Texas counties and cities began to sue Texas
over SB4’s constitutionality.70 The litigation is still pending at the time
of this writing, and the merits of the litigation are beyond this Article’s scope.71
The jury’s verdict in Garcia Zarate’s trial then resurged the sanctuary-city debate. The defense argued at trial that “the shooting was
accidental and the bullet ricocheted off the ground and traveled about 80
feet before hitting Steinle.”72 The jury found Garcia Zarate not guilty of
murder, manslaughter, and assault with a deadly weapon. Instead, he was
convicted only of being a felon in possession of a firearm.73 In response
to the verdict, Governor Abbott tweeted: “Kat[ie] Steinle’s tragic death
shows why the ‘sanctuary cities’ movement threatens the safety of all
Americans. It’s also why Texas banned sanctuary city policies.”74
C. SB4’s Provisions

SB4 has two main provisions: (1) the ICE-detainer provision; and
(2) the enforcement-cooperation provision.
68
Andrea Zelinski, Federal Judge Tosses Paxton’s Preemptive SB4 Lawsuit, Hous. Chron.
(Aug. 9, 2017, 7:52 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/Federal-judge-tosses-Paxton-s-preemptive-SB4-11746384.php.
69
Id.
70
Jackie Wang, Border City, County Sue Texas over “Sanctuary” Law, Tex. Trib. (May 9, 2017,
12:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/09/border-city-county-sue-texas-over-sanctuary-cities-law-constitutionali.
71
As of January 2019, the status of the litigation is as follows: The District Court entered
a preliminary injunction enjoining several of SB4’s provisions. The Fifth Circuit, however,
reversed the preliminary injunction on all provisions except one, finding that the provisions
did not violate the Constitution on their face. This ruling allowed SB4’s major provisions to go
into effect while the litigation proceeds. In other words, Texas can enforce both the ICE-detainer provision and the enforcement-cooperation provision (discussed in the next Part) while
the litigation is pending. El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018).
72
Holly Yan & Dan Simon, Undocumented Immigrant Acquitted in Katie Steinle Death,
CNN (Dec. 1, 2017, 2:21 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/us/kate-steinle-murder-trial-verdict/index.html.
73
Id.
74
Greg Abbott (@GregAbbott_TX), Twitter (Dec. 3, 2017, 10:21 AM), https://twitter.com/
GregAbbott_TX/status/937386267184128000.
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1. ICE-Detainer Provision
SB4’s ICE-detainer provision requires a law enforcement agency
to (1) “comply with, honor, and fulfill any request made in [a] detainer
request” from the federal government; and (2) “inform the person that the
person is being held pursuant to an immigration detainer request issued
by [ICE].”75 Intentional violations of this provision are prohibited.76
The ICE-detainer provision has one exception: A law enforcement
agency is not required to comply with the two requirements above if the
detained person “has provided proof that the person is a citizen of the
United States or that the person has lawful immigration status in the
United States, such as a Texas driver’s license or similar government-issued identification.”77
2. Enforcement-Cooperation Provision
SB4’s enforcement-cooperation provision prohibits local law
enforcement agencies from (1) adopting, enforcing, or endorsing “a policy under which the entity or department prohibits or materially limits
the enforcement of immigration laws”; or (2) prohibiting or materially
limiting the enforcement of immigration laws “as demonstrated by pattern or practice.”78
This provision also states that a local law enforcement agency may
not prohibit or materially limit a specified official from doing any of
the following:
inquiring into the immigration status of a person under a lawful
detention or under arrest; with respect to information relating
to the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any person
under a lawful detention or under arrest, including information
regarding the person’s place of birth: sending the information
to or requesting or receiving the information from [specified
agencies]; maintaining the information; or exchanging the information with another local entity or campus police department
or a federal or state governmental entity assisting or cooperating with a federal immigration officer as reasonable or necessary,
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 2.251(a).
Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(3).
77
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.251(b).
78
Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a). As of January 2019, the first provision is subject to a preliminary injunction. El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 173.
75
76
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including providing enforcement assistance; or permitting a
federal immigration officer to enter and conduct enforcement
activities at a jail to enforce federal immigration laws.79
When an officer is dealing with a victim or witness, however, SB4
prohibits the officer from inquiring into the person’s immigration status
unless “the officer determines that the inquiry is necessary to: (1) investigate the offense; or (2) provide the victim or witness with information
about federal visas designed to protect individuals providing assistance
to law enforcement.”80
D. Similar State Legislation

In April 2010, Arizona enacted Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070)—a controversial immigration law that wound up in the United States Supreme
Court. SB 1070’s origin is very similar to SB4’s. Like SB4, which was
sparked by Steinle’s death, SB 1070 was sparked by the killing of an
Arizona rancher, Robert Krentz, on his ranch nineteen miles from the
U.S./Mexico border.81 People claimed that an undocumented immigrant
killed Krentz. But unlike Steinle’s killer who was an identified undocumented immigrant, Krentz’s killer was never identified; instead, it was a
mere guess or hunch that the killer was an undocumented immigrant.82
But Arizona lawmakers still used that rhetoric to launch SB 1070.
SB 1070 quickly became known as the show-me-your-papers law
because of its most controversial provision, § 2(b).83 That provision
requires “state officers to make a ‘reasonable attempt . . . to determine
the immigration status’ of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some
other legitimate basis if ‘reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.’”84 Officers, however,
Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(b).
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.13(d).
81
William Arrocha, From Arizona’s S.B. 1070 to Georgia’s H.B. 87 and Alabama’s H.B.
56: Exacerbating the Other and Generating New Discourses and Practices of Segregation, 48
Cal. W.L. Rev. 245, 260 (2012); Dennis Wagner, Slaying of Ariz. Rancher Is Still a Mystery,
USA Today (Nov. 24, 2013, 8:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/24/
ariz-rancher-slaying-border-security/3693549.
82
Wagner, supra note 81.
83
Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 Wake Forest J.L. & Pol’y 367, 388 (2013); James
Barragan, How Texas’ Sanctuary Cities Ban Compares to Arizona’s ‘Show Me Your Papers’
Law, Dall. News (Jun. 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2017/06/26/texas-sanctuary-cities-ban-compares-arizonas-show-papers-law.
84
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012).
79
80
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“may not consider race, color[,] or national origin” when enforcing this
provision, “except to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona Constitution.”85
SB 1070’s stated purpose is to “discourage and deter the unlawful
entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”86 Critics, however, argue that SB 1070
institutionalizes racial profiling, compromises public safety and health,
creates hostile environments for immigrants, and hurts the economy.87
The DOJ filed suit against Arizona, challenging SB 1070’s constitutionality.88 The Supreme Court, while holding that three of the four
provisions were preempted, upheld the show-me-your-papers provision, § 2(b).89 The Court reasoned that “[t]he nature and timing of [the]
case counsel caution in evaluating” this provision because the DOJ was
challenging the provision before it had gone into effect.90 Thus, because
of the “basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be
enforced,” the Court found it “inappropriate to assume § 2(B) [would]
be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.”91 In other
words, the Court held that § 2(b) was not preempted on its face.92 The
Court did, however, leave open the possibility for preemption and constitutional challenges “to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes
into effect.”93
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (emphasis added).
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
87
Alex Lach, The Top 5 Reasons Why S.B. 1070 Damages America, Ctr. for Am. Progress (June 25, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/
news/2012/06/25/11785/the-top-5-reasons-why-s-b-1070-damages-america; Alex Nowrasteh,
Arizona-Style Immigration Laws Hurt the Economy, Forbes (Oct. 12, 2012, 10:52 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/alexnowrasteh/2012/10/12/arizona-style-immigration-laws-hurt-the-economy/#25b5c1f615b9; Bill Ong Hing, Like it or Not, Arizona’s SB 1070 is About Racial Profiling, Huffpost (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-ong-hing/arizona-immigration-law_b_1457435.html.
88
Arizona, 567 U.S. 387; Citing Conflict with Federal Law, Department of Justice Challenges
Arizona Immigration Law, U.S. DOJ (July 6, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/citing-conflict-federal-law-department-justice-challenges-arizona-immigration-law.
89
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 415.
90
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 415.
91
Id.
92
Id.; see Valle Del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV-10-0101-PHX-SRB, 2015 WL 12030514, at *1
(D. Ariz. Sept. 4, 2015) (“In Arizona, the Supreme Court held that . . . Section 2(B) was not
preempted on its face.”).
93
Id.
85
86

80

2019]

Texas’s Ban of Sanctuary Cities

On July 17, 2012—not even a month after the Supreme Court’s Arizona decision—the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), on behalf
of several civil rights organizations, sought a preliminary injunction
against § 2(b) and submitted evidence to show that it would be implemented unconstitutionally.94 The court refused to enjoin § 2(b), stating
that it would “not ignore the clear direction in the Arizona opinion that
Subsection 2(B) cannot be challenged further on its face before the law
takes effect.”95 At the summary judgment stage, the court again refused
to entertain the plaintiffs’ facial challenge to § 2(B).96 The parties then
settled, ending six years of litigation.97 Under the settlement agreement,
Arizona police officers can check the immigration status of people suspected as being in the country unlawfully.98 But officers are not allowed
to base those suspicions on race or ethnicity, stop people solely for investigating immigration status, or prolong a detention, arrest, or stop solely
to verify immigration status.99 Essentially, the settlement agreement
allowed Arizona to preserve § 2(b), while addressing the plaintiffs’ constitutional concerns.
Although Arizona faced significant legal battles and backlash, its
passage of SB 1070 nevertheless prompted other states to pass immigration-related legislation.100 In 2011, five states—Alabama, Georgia,
Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah—passed legislation similar to SB
1070. And between 2012 and 2017, state legislatures introduced hundreds of immigration-related bills, some of which were enacted as laws.101
SB4 was amongst those enacted in 2017.
94
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support at 1, Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB, 2012 WL
8021265, (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2012).
95
Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB, 2012 WL 8021265, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 5, 2012).
96
Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV-10-01061-PHX-SRB, 2015 WL 12030514, at *4 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 4, 2015).
97
Kelly Knaub, Ariz. Settles ‘Show Me Your Papers’ Suit, Law360 (Sept. 16, 2016 1:01 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/840781/ariz-settles-show-me-your-papers-suit.
98
Knaub, supra note 97; State of Arizona, Office of the Attorney General, No. I16–010,
Informal Attorney General Opinion: Advisory Model Policy for Law Enforcement Applying SB 1070 (2016).
99
Knaub, supra note 97; State of Arizona, supra note 97.
100
State Omnibus Immigration Legislation and Legal Challenges, NCSL (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.
aspx.
101
Id.
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Table 1: Relevant Differences between SB4 and SB 1070:102

Prohibits law enforcement
agency policies limiting
immigration law enforcement
or cooperation with the
federal government

SB4

SB 1070

Yes

Yes

Requires or permits police
officers to inquire into a
person’s immigration status
during an encounter

Permits

Requires law enforcement
agencies to honor all
ICE detainers

Yes

No

Permits warrantless arrests of
people who have committed a
deportable offense

No

Yes

Allows officers to transport
undocumented immigrants in
custody to federal authorities

No

Yes

II.

Previously required, but the attorney
general has instructed officers to ignore
this provision

In Practice, What Will SB4 Change?
A. Racial Profiling v. Probable Cause

One of the major debates surrounding SB4 is whether SB4 will
lead to racial profiling. Specifically, SB4’s opponents argue that police
officers will use SB4 to racially profile minority groups.103 In response,
102
Comparison: Texas SB 4 vs. Arizona SB 1070, Nat’l Immigr. F. (last visited Jan. 9, 2019),
https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Texas-SB-4-AZ-SB-1070-Comparison-Chart.pdf.
103
Jim Vertuno, Texas Lawmakers Pass Bill Allowing Police to Ask About Immigration Status, USA Today (May 3, 2017, 9:19 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/05/03/texas-sanctuary-cities-bill-immigration-status-police/101268244, (“The GOPled Senate passed the bill Wednesday despite objections from Democrats, who call the bill a
“show-me-your-papers” measure that will be used to discriminate against Latinos.”); Brief of
Amicus Curiae City of San Marcos, Texas at 7, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, (No. 15:17-cv-404OLG) (W.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2017) (“SB4 will have its greatest impact on Hispanic individuals and
others whose physical appearance and attributes lead law enforcement officers to question
them about their immigration status after they have been detained.”); First Amended Complaint of City of San Antonio, Texas, Bexar County, City of El Paso, Texas, Rey A. Saldana,
Texas Association of Chicanos in Higher Education, La Union Del Pueblo Entero, and Workers Defense Project at 30, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F.Supp.3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“San
Antonio Police Chief McManus stated that SB[4] would . . . result in racial discrimination.”)
[hereinafter First Amended Complaint of San Antonio]; City of Austin’s Opposed Motion for
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Governor Abbott stated: “If you are not someone who has committed a
crime, you have absolutely nothing to worry about . . . . There are laws
against racial profiling, and those laws will be strictly enforced.”104
Of the police departments interviewed, most of their views seem
more in line with Governor Abbott’s statement on racial profiling. The
officers understand that someone’s skin color does not give an officer
probable cause to stop that person.105 For example, Officer David Rodriguez with the Fort Worth Police Department believes that SB4 received
the racial-profiling backlash because the media and community did not
understand the difference between racial profiling and probable cause.106
In fact, Officer Rodriguez used himself as an example. He stated that
when off duty, he looks like any other Hispanic male—he listens to
Spanish music and has many Hispanic friends. But an officer must still
have a “legal reason to pull [him] over,” besides the fact that he is a
Hispanic male.107
Officer Rodriguez also stated that the Fort Worth Police Department is committed to ensuring that its officers do not racially profile.108
In the Fort Worth Police Department’s SB4 brochure (discussed further
in Subpart II.E), the department promised to “[e]nforce state and federal laws in a responsible and professional manner without regard to race,
Preliminary Injunction, Declaration of Jordy Balderas at 3, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264
F.Supp.3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“Even though I am a United States citizen, because I am a
darker-skinned Latino man, I am likely to be racially profiled.”); City of Austin’s Opposed
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Declaration of Delia Garza at 3–4, City of El Cenizo v.
Texas, 264 F.Supp.3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“I cannot countenance the idea that I—or anyone
in my family or community—will be subject to increased police enforcement based upon our
appearance. Such a police regime reminds me of the Gestapo in Nazi Germany, the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, and other historical examples of martial
law applied against second-class citizens.”).
104
Alex Samuels, Gov. Greg Abbott: “Sanctuary” Law Won’t Open the Door for Racial Profiling, Tex. Trib. (May 16, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/16/gov-gregabbott-sanctuary-cities-bill-wont-open-door-racial-profiling.
105
Interview with Christopher Martin, Officer, Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office, in Fort
Worth, Tex. (Oct. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Officer Martin Interview].
106
Interview with David Rodriguez, Public Affairs, City of Fort Worth Police Department,
in Fort Worth, Tex. (Oct. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Officer Rodriguez Interview].
107
Id. The Author acknowledges that Officer Rodriguez is known to other police officers
and therefore would likely be treated differently. Officer Rodriguez, however, was speaking
hypothetically, using an example based on himself. He was not speaking directly to his experience of being racially profiled since SB4 was enacted.
108
Officer David Rodriguez, Public Affairs, City of Fort Worth Police Department, at the
Fort Worth Community Meeting (Oct. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Officer Rodriguez at Community
Meeting].
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ethnicity[,] or national origin.”109 The brochure also states that “Fort
Worth Officers will NOT . . . [e]ngage in racial profiling.”110
Deputy Chief Robert Silva, a Hispanic male with a heavy accent,
works for the Bexar County Sheriff’s Office. He also used himself as an
example when discussing racial profiling: If an officer stopped him for
speeding and asked, “were you born in the United States,” his answer
would be “no,” because he was born to U.S. citizen parents outside the
United States.111 Could an officer arrest him based solely on his answer?
Deputy Chief Silva said, “Absolutely not, because someone can be a U.S.
citizen by a plethora of ways.”112 He also said that Bexar County Sheriff’s Office is not “running IDs just because someone has darker skin and
an accent.”113 If they were, Deputy Chief Silva said he would be stopped
every other day. Accordingly, he doesn’t think that SB4 will lead to racial
profiling in “any way, shape, or form.”114
Commander John Lara with the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office
does not think that SB4 will lead to racial profiling in his county, but
he emphasized that this is very community specific.115 For example, in
El Paso County, it would be more difficult to racially profile Hispanic
individuals because the County’s population is 90 percent Hispanic.116
Commander Lara noted that it would be easier to racially profile a different ethnic group rather than Hispanic individuals.
Although the officers interviewed said that racial profiling will not
occur, and their answers give us insight on their thought processes, we
still cannot impute those anecdotal answers to all Texas law enforcement
officers. So looking at a similar legislation’s impact on racial profiling
would be helpful to determine whether SB4 will lead to racial profiling.
109
Fort Worth Police Dep’t, Understanding Senate Bill 4 (2017) [hereinafter understanding Senate Bill 4].
110
Id.
111
Telephone Interview with Robert Silva, Deputy Chief, Community Readiness and Intelligence Division of Bexar County Sheriff’s Office (Nov. 17, 2017) [Hereinafter Deputy Chief
Silva Interview].
112
Id. The Author acknowledges that Deputy Chief Silva is known to other police officers
and therefore would likely be treated differently. Deputy Chief Silva, however, was speaking
hypothetically, using an example based on himself. He was not speaking directly to his experience of being racially profiled since SB4 was enacted.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Telephone Interview with John Lara, Commander, El Paso County Sheriff’s Office (Nov.
22, 2017) [hereinafter Commander Lara Interview].
116
Id.

84

2019]

Texas’s Ban of Sanctuary Cities

But unfortunately, SB 1070, which is often compared to SB4, does not
provide much guidance. There does not appear to be any statistical data
or studies post–SB 1070 to provide proof that SB 1070 led to racial profiling. Further, SB4’s main provisions did not go into effect until March
2018 (because the trial court issued a preliminary injunction), leaving
less than a year of implementation with no reliable data available.117
Therefore, whether SB4 will lead police officers to racially profile individuals will likely depend on whether it is enforced in practice—similar
to the Supreme Court’s holding on § 2(b) of SB 1070.118
B. Reports to Police by Victims and Witnesses

1. Lower Crime Reporting and Cooperation
As noted in Subpart II.C.2 of this Article, when an officer is dealing
with a victim or witness, SB4 prohibits the officer from inquiring into
the person’s immigration status unless “the officer determines that the
inquiry is necessary to: (1) investigate the offense; or (2) provide the
victim or witness with information about federal visas designed to protect individuals providing assistance to law enforcement.”119 Whether
SB4 has impacted the reporting of crimes by victims or witnesses varies
by community.
Three of the four largest Texas cities—Houston, Dallas, and Austin—have experienced either lower crime reporting by the immigrant
community or reduced cooperation of victims in the immigrant community. Although lower crime reporting sometimes correlates with
lower crime rates, in this instance the lower reporting is likely due to
immigrant community’s fear, which is confirmed by Texas police officers’ statements. For example, Officer Taylor Olivarez with the Houston
Police Department stated that in Houston, Texas, it is not just rhetoric or
rumor—the number of reports are dwindling because people in immigrant communities do not want to speak up if they see a crime.120 Officer
Olivarez’s boss, Chief Art Acevedo, stated that in the first three months
of 2017, reports by Hispanics of sexual assault dropped nearly 43 percent
El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 173.
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 415 (upholding § 2(b) and reasoning that “[t]he nature and timing
of [the] case counsel caution in evaluating” this provision because the DOJ was challenging
the provision before it had gone into effect.).
119
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.13(d) (emphasis added).
120
Telephone Interview of Taylor Olivarez, Officer, Houston Police Department (Nov. 21,
2017) [hereinafter Officer Olivarez Interview].
117

118
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percent compared to 2016, and the reports by Hispanics of robberies
and assaults dropped 12 percent.121 In Dallas, Texas, prosecutors have
also seen a decrease in cooperation from immigrant communities. “The
number of dismissals of domestic violence cases has increased because
the complainants fail to appear or respond to prosecutors’ attempt[s] to
contact them.”122 And in Austin Texas, the “Austin Police Department
has encountered crime victims, or close relatives of crime victims, who
are unwilling to engage in the criminal justice system” due to deportation fears.123
Other cities, however, have not experienced lower crime reports
or cooperation from the immigrant community. The Bexar County
Sheriff’s Office (in San Antonio, Texas) has not seen a lower reporting
of crime from immigrant communities since SB4’s announcement.124
Deputy Chief Silva ran the statistics, and the numbers reflect that immigrants are still coming forward and reporting crime.125 Likewise, Deputy
Chief Jeremy Alaniz with the Arlington Police Department stated that
his department has not seen a lower reporting of crime. He monitors
the community-participation level to determine the overall trust within
the community. If the people are not participating in the department’s
programs, he would be concerned. But people in the community are participating, so Deputy Chief Alaniz’s interpretation is that people are still
willing to engage with the officers.126 Similarly, El Paso County Sheriff’s
Office has not seen a drop in incidents reported.127 Commander John
Lara believes that El Paso County did not see a drop because it was
one of the first Texas counties to speak out against SB4.128 But he noted
that SB4 can have far reaching effects beyond the undocumented
121
John Burnett, New Immigration Crackdowns Creating ‘Chilling Effect’ on Crime Reporting, NPR (May 25, 2017, 4:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/529513771/new-immigration-crackdowns-creating-chilling-effect-on-crime-reporting.
122
City of Dallas’s Complaint in Intervention at 13, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F.
Supp.3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
123
City of Austin’s Complaint in Intervention at 11, City of San Antonio v. Texas, 264 F.
Supp.3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
124
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
125
Id.
126
Telephone Interview of Jeremy Alaniz, Deputy Chief, Arlington Police Department
(Nov. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview].
127
Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115.
128
Id.
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immigrant—if someone lives in a mixed status family, it can cause the
person with legal status not to talk.129
It is unclear why the cities experiencing lower crime reporting
and lower cooperation from the immigrant community are larger cities. One possible explanation is that more undocumented immigrants
live in bigger cities rather than smaller ones. Specifically, according to
2014 estimates, “61% of the 11.1 million undocumented . . . immigrants
in the U.S. live[d] in big cities.”130 And every 6 in 10 undocumented
immigrants lived in 1 of 20 specific metro areas.131 Houston and Dallas
(which was combined with Arlington and Fort Worth) were listed in the
2014 estimates as #3 and #4 respectively.132 Austin was listed as #20. San
Antonio and El Paso were not on this list.133 Thus, a high immigrant population may correlate with lower crime reporting and lower cooperation.
Although there are likely many factors at play, a high immigrant population may partly explain why the larger cities are the ones experiencing
decreased cooperation and crime reporting.
2. U and T Visas
It is important to note that undocumented immigrants generally are victimized more often than individuals with legal status;134 so if
undocumented immigrants are not reporting crimes, we should all be
concerned because the aggressor is free to victimize others. Aggressors
will often threaten undocumented immigrants with their unlawful status,
telling them that “reaching out for help will result in their removal or
separation from their children.”135 So SB4’s exception to asking victims
Id.
Charlotte Alter, Majority of America’s Undocumented Immigrants Live in 20 Urban
Areas, Time (Feb. 9, 2017), http://time.com/4665544/undocumented-u-s-immigrants-live-in-major-cities.
131
See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’vera Cohn, 20 Metro Areas are Home to Six-in-Ten Unauthorized Immigrants in U.S., Pew Research Ctr. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/02/09/us-metro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Frances Bernat, Immigration and Crime, Oxford Res. Encyclopedias (Apr. 2017),
http://oxfordre.com/criminology/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/acrefore-9780190264079-e-93.
135
Id. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Major Cities Chiefs Association, Police Executive
Research Forum, and United States Conference of Mayors at 9, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264
F.Supp.3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“A number of studies have shown that abusive partners may
utilize the threat of deportation in order to maintain power and control.”) [hereinafter Major
Cities Chiefs Ass’n]; Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
129
130
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or witnesses about their immigration status to inform them about federal visas may be very critical.
Without a lawyer, most undocumented immigrants are not aware of
the visas available. For example, U and T visas offer protections to crime
victims if the victims meet certain criteria.136 Generally, both the U and
T visas allow the person to work in the United States for four years and
create a path to lawful permanent resident status.137 Both visas require
an outside agency—which can be a police department—to certify that
the person was a victim of a qualifying crime and helpful to the police.138
136
U and T Visa Law Enforcement Resource Guide, Dep’t of Homeland Security 3 (last visited Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/U-and-T-Visa-Law-Enforcement-Resource%20Guide_1.4.16.pdf [hereinafter U and T Visa Resource Guide].
The requirements for a U Visa are that the victim:
• Is the direct or indirect victim of qualifying criminal activity;
• Has suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been
a victim of criminal activity;
• Has information about the criminal activity; and
• Was helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to law enforcement,
prosecutors, judges, or other officials in the detection, investigation, prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of the criminal activity. Id. at 4.
The requirements for a T Visa are that the victim:
• Is or was a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons (which may include sex or labor trafficking), as defined by federal law;
• Is in the United States, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands or at a U.S. port of entry due to trafficking;
• Has complied with any reasonable request from a law enforcement agency
for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of human trafficking; and
• Would suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm if removed from the United States. Id. at 9.
For both the U and T visa, the victim must also be admissible to the United
States. Id. at 4, 9.
137
Id. at 4–5, 9–10. “If certain conditions are met, an individual with a U visa may apply
for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status . . . after three years.” Id. at 5. And “individual with T nonimmigrant status may apply for adjustment to lawful permanent resident
status . . . after three years in the United States or upon completion of the investigation or
prosecution, whichever occurs earlier.” Id. at 10.
It is important to note, however, that a person can still be deported while the U visa application is pending. The person could then potentially return to the United States once the visa
is approved. Whether to proceed with the removal proceedings is discretionary. Questions
and Answers for U Visa Applicants, Immigr. Law Ctr. of Minnesota (last visited May 7, 2018),
https://www.ilcm.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/U-visa-client-FAQ-English.pdf.
138
U and T Visa Resource Guide, supra note 136, at 5, 11; U Visas and the Role of Local
Police In Preventing and Investigating Crimes Against Immigrants, Subject to Debate (Police
Executive Research Forum) 1, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Subject_to_Debate/
Debate2017/debate_2017_junaug.pdf [hereinafter Subject to Debate]. http://www.policeforum.
org/assets/docs/Subject_to_Debate/Debate2017/debate_2017_junaug.pdf.
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Because police departments do not want victims or witnesses to go into
hiding because of deportation fears,139 the departments should consider
implementing a proactive visa program where the officers certify victims’
and witnesses’ visa applications.
Some police departments seem very willing and capable of helping
victims and witnesses with federal visa applications. For example, Fort
Worth officers and Bexar County officers help the victims and witnesses
fill out the necessary paperwork for visas.140 Arlington Police Department and El Paso County Sheriff’s Office send the victims and witnesses
to victims’ services units within the department, which can connect the
victims and witnesses to a variety of resources, such as federal visa applications.141 Dallas Police Department and Austin Police Department also
both help with federal visa applications.142
Although the U Visa has not been directly linked to crime reporting
through scientific data, “police executives credit U Visa-related certifications with bridging gaps between their agencies and undocumented
victims in the community.”143 In 2006, the San Francisco Police Department successfully implemented a proactive U Visa program.144 Sergeant
Antonio Flores with that department stated: “Everyone in policing
wants to find innovative ways to build trust, particularly with community
members who are historically inclined not to come to us. U visas are
just that.”145 Susan Bowyer, Deputy Director of the Immigration Center
for Women and Children, surveyed some of their clients who obtained
U visas to show the visa’s positive impact.146 Of respondents, 100 per139

111.

Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115; Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note

140
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106; Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note
111. In fact, Bexar County Sheriff’s Office sponsors their undocumented witnesses for visas.
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
141
Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126; Commander Lara Interview, supra note
115.
142
Dallas Police Department U Visa Nonimmigrant Status Certification Policy,
AILA—Tex. Chapter 1 (last visited Feb. 12, 2018), http://www.ailatexas.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/08/U-Visa-Policy-rev2017.pdf; U Visa Nonimmigrant Status Certifications,
Austin Police Dep’t 1 (Dec. 13, 2017), http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/Austin-B301b-Nonimmigrant-Status-Certifications-053008.pdf.
143
Subject to Debate, supra note 138, at 4.
144
Id. at 5.
145
Id. at 4.
146
Id. at 6.
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cent stated that their life has gotten better and they feel more safe.147
The data also showed a positive impact on visa recipients’ children.148
The law enforcement agencies that do not already provide these services
should consider doing so “as an investigative and community policing
tool to improve the delivery of police services to all crime victims.”149
Police departments should not be hesitant to certify visa applications. A crime victim’s visa application does not require the police
department to “vouch for” the victim’s admissibility into the United
States.150 Law enforcement agencies are also not liable if the victim later
commits a crime.151 Instead, the police officers only have to certify that
the person was a victim of a qualifying crime and was helpful to police in
reporting or prosecuting the crime.152
The bottom line is that victims and witnesses need protection
regardless of immigration status, and this protection should come in the
form of a visa for qualifying individuals. Police officers’ active role in
certifying U visas has many positive effects with no apparent negative
effects. If we want to increase these positive effects, SB4’s exceptions
to asking victims and witnesses about their immigration status is crucial.

147
148

Id.
Id.

[C]ertain family members of a U visa recipient may also be eligible to live
and work in the United States as “derivative” U visa recipients based on their
relationship with the principal recipient. These include:
Unmarried children under the age of 21;
Spouse;
Parents of U visa petitioners under age 21; and
Unmarried siblings under 18 years old of U visa petitioners under age 21.
U and T Visa Resource Guide, supra note 136, at 5. The “derivative” family members for
T visa recipients include:
Unmarried children under the age of 21;
Spouse;
Parents of principal T visa recipients under age 21 at the time of application;
Unmarried siblings under 18 years old of principal T visa applicants under age
21; and Adult or minor children of certain immediate family members of the
T visa recipient. Id. at 10.
149
See Subject to Debate, supra note 138, at 3 (emphasis in original). For DHS’s best practice recommendations for certifying U and T visas, see U and T Visa Resource Guide, supra
note 136.
150
Subject to Debate, supra note 138, at 10.
151
Id.
152
Id.
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So before writing off these exceptions as a drawback,153 we must consider
the benefits of an undocumented immigrant receiving a U or T visa.
C. Inquiries Into Immigration Status

1. The Need to Identify People
SB4 is unlikely to significantly impact police departments’ daily
operations because SB4 does not change when officers will inquire into
immigration status.154 Prior to SB4, some departments had policies that
prohibited officers from inquiring into a person’s immigration status,155
while some departments did not have any immigration policy because
they did not feel it was necessary.156 But regardless of the departments’
policies, there is a consensus among the departments interviewed of
when an officer out on patrol would inquire into a person’s immigration status—to identify someone—and when an officer would not—to
enforce federal immigration law or to decide whether to arrest or ticket
someone.157 Part of an officer’s role in the field is to identify people.158
This is partly based on safety concerns and partly because officers need
to ensure that they are arresting or issuing a ticket to the correct person.
If a person is not carrying an ID, the officer will have to ask more questions to identify the person.159
While Texas police departments cannot set policies that prohibit
or materially limit immigration-law enforcement,160 Fort Worth Police
Department’s cumbersome policies seem to discourage its officers from
Major Cities Chiefs Ass’n, supra note 135, at 9–10.
Officer Martin Interview, supra note 105 (stating that SB4 does not “change the way
that [Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office] does business); Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra
note 126 (stating that he does not believe that SB4 will have an impact on the department’s
daily operations); Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111 (stating that “SB4 won’t change
[the department’s] policies” or impact its daily operations); Commander Lara Interview, supra
note 115 (stating that El Paso County Sheriff’s Office’s goal is for SB4 to not impact its daily
operations).
155
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106; First Amended Complaint of San Antonio,
supra note 103, at 28; Officer Olivarez Interview, supra note 120; Commander Lara Interview,
supra note 115 (stating that EPCSO officers were not allowed to inquire into immigration status without reasonable suspicion to do so because this prevents officers from arbitrarily asking
people about their immigration status).
156
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
157
Officer Martin Interview, supra note 105; Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126;
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106; Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115.
158
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106.
159
Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115.
160
Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a).
153
154
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inquiring into immigration status. It could be argued, however, that
cumbersome policies like Fort Worth Police Department’s demonstrate
a “pattern or practice” of prohibiting or materially limiting immigration-law enforcement.161 Fort Worth Police Department’s old policy
for inquiring into immigration status was about half of a page long; it’s
new policy since SB4’s enactment is about four pages long and sets out
the procedures officers must follow when inquiring into immigration
status.162 First, the officer must activate his or her body camera when
inquiring into immigration status.163 Second, the officer must fill out a
Verification of Immigration Status Report, which must include, but is
not limited to: describing what occurred; identifying the supervisor contacted, vulnerable persons with the detained person, and the number of
officers required to assist; indicating whether officers contacted ICE and
if so, the time of ICE’s arrival; indicating whether the vehicle was towed;
and specifying the verification’s outcome.164 Between September 1, 2017
and October 24, 2017, Fort Worth Police Department had zero inquiries
to the Department of Public Safety to verify a person’s immigration status.165 Officer Rodriguez believes this is proof that officers have more
important priorities over federal immigration law.166
Officers do not inquire into a person’s immigration status out in
the field for the purpose of enforcing immigration law.167 For example,
Deputy Chief Silva was previously a special agent with DHS for 14 years.
He understands that immigration law is complex and knows that if officers do not have extensive training and the necessary databases to verify
immigration status with certainty, they cannot assess citizenship on the
Id.
Fort Worth Police Dep’t, General Orders 128–32, https://www.fortworthpd.com/docmgmt/Web-10_12_17.pdf, [hereinafter FWPD General Orders].
163
Id. at 129.
164
Id. at 129–30.
165
Officer Rodriguez at Community Meeting, supra note 108.
166
Id.
167
Officer Martin Interview, supra note 105 (stating that TCSO is not going to be a strong
arm for the federal government); Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126 (He stated
that whether an officer decides to arrest someone should have nothing to do with immigration;
it is based on a criminal act. Officers will not arrest someone because of their immigration
status—it is solely based on a criminal violation, “period.”); Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
161
162
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street.168 Accordingly, Bexar County Sheriff’s Office is “not going to
enforce immigration law.”169
An officer also would not inquire into a person’s immigration status
when deciding whether to arrest someone for a crime or give them a
ticket instead of a warning. Officers make that decision based on whether the person committed a criminal offense under state and local laws,
not whether they are undocumented.170
Thus, in practice, SB4 does not appear to change when an officer
would inquire into a person’s immigration status. Accordingly, most of
the departments interviewed were confident that SB4 would not impact
their daily operations. They also believe that SB4 does not remove
too much discretion from the officers during patrol because it does not
require officers to inquire into immigration status—it merely allows it.
An officer’s discretion for how to proceed based on criminal activity
remains unchanged.171 Officer Rodriguez put this issue in context: When
an officer pulls someone over for running a red light and the department
has twenty serious calls pending, the officer must allocate his resources—that is where the officer has discretion. Would the officer really take
forty-five minutes to an hour to complete an immigration investigation
when more serious crimes also need attention? Officer Rodriguez did
not seem to think so.172
2. Undocumented Immigrants Carrying Non-U.S. Identification
As stated above, the main reason an officer would inquire into
immigration status is when an officer needs to identify a person. This
raises the question of whether an undocumented immigrant should carry a non-U.S. ID. Undocumented immigrants or their attorneys must
evaluate this question on a case-by-case basis by examining the costs
and benefits. All police departments interviewed agreed that, from
their perspective, a person is always better off carrying some form of ID,
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
Id.
170
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106 (“Officers may not take an undocumented
person into custody solely upon the suspicion that the individual has entered this country
illegally.”); Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126; Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra
note 111.
171
Officer Martin Interview, supra note 105; Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106;
Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126; Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
172
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106.
168
169
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regardless of where it came from.173 According to Officer Rodriguez, a
person “gain[s] 95% of a police officer’s trust” when the person shows
the officer an ID.174 Failing to present an ID to a police officer will certainly lead to additional questioning.175
Immigration attorneys, however, often advise their clients not to
carry a foreign ID for various reasons (discussed further below).176 After
all, the person has a right to remain silent when questioned by an officer;
so, with a few exceptions, a person does not have to discuss their immigration status.177 Further, providing a foreign ID or other evidence of
foreign birth would also help the ICE meet its burden of proving alienage.178 ICE has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that a person is an alien and removable.179 Only after alienage is proven does deportation become an issue. If the undocumented immigrant
provides a foreign ID and it ends up in ICE’s hands, a rebuttable
173
Id.; Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126; Officer Olivarez Interview, supra note
120; Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115.
174
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106.
175
In El Paso County, if an officer still cannot identify a person, it may lead to that officer
contacting Border Patrol to help identify the person. Commander Lara Interview, supra note
115.
176
Immigration Raids: Know Your Rights!, La Cooperativa (last visited Dec. 6, 2017),
http://www.lacooperativa.org/immigration-raids-know-rights, (“[I]f you are arrested or detained, . . . [d]o not tell the officer where you were born, your nationality, or what your immigration status is. Do not sign any papers. Do not show the agent any papers or identification
documents from your country of origin . . . . If the police or an immigration official stops
you on the street . . . [d]o not say anything about your immigration status or where you were
born.”); Know Your Rights: What to Do if You’re Stopped by Police, Immigration Agents or
the FBI, ACLU (last visited Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/what-do-ifyoure-stopped-police-immigration-agents-or-fbi [hereinafter ACLU Know Your Rights]
177
U.S. Const. amend. X (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”); ACLU Know Your Rights, supra note 176 (“If you are questioned about your immigration status . . . [and] you do not have immigration papers, say you
want to remain silent.”). Separate rules may apply at airports and international borders. Also,
if a person is in the United States on a visa, they must disclose that to federal immigration
officers. Lawdlgleo, SB4: What you Need to Know, De La Garza Law, PLLC (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://lawdlg.com/sb4-what-you-need-to-know.
178
See, e.g., Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605, 608–10 (9th Cir. 1995); Lopez-Chavez v. INS, 259
F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that once a prima facie case of alienage is established
through proof of foreign birth, the alien has the burden of proving time, place and manner of
entry).
179
8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a). This standard is higher than a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard but lower than a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Removal Proceedings, Catholic
Legal Immigr. Network, Inc. (last visited Feb. 12, 2018), https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/
files/ch_1_clinic_representing_clients_in_imm_court.pdf.
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presumption of alienage is created.180 Police officers, however, do not
view this in the same way attorneys do—for officers, it is about safety.181
Once a person shows a foreign ID, the officer has discretion of
whether to inquire into the person’s immigration status. Unfortunately,
Texas does not provide driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants.182
Deputy Chief Silva, however, said that the fact that a person shows a
consular ID from a different country just confirms that person’s identity; but absent a crime, that person has nothing to fear.183 Commander
Lara stated that even if the ID is a Mexican passport, “at least we know
who they are.”184
That outcome, however, can never be guaranteed to an undocumented immigrant, and carrying a foreign ID may be a gamble depending
on which officer initiates the traffic stop. For example, Felipe’s story,
although it occurred outside Texas, represents one scenario that may
happen. Felipe, a twenty-nine-year-old Mexican National, lived in the
United States since he was four years old.185 In early 2010, he was pulled
over while driving, and he did not have a state driver’s license.186 He
presented the officers with a Mexican driver’s license and passport, which
the officers claimed were “clearly fakes.”187 The officers arrested Felipe
for felony possession of fraudulent documents.188 When his mother called
the jail, the officer said he could not disclose Felipe’s charges because of
180
Robert James McWhirter, Immigration Law for Criminal Lawyers: Overview, 16 Crim.
Just. 18, 24 (2002).
181
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106; Kevin O’Neil, Consular ID Cards: Mexico and Beyond, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Apr. 1, 2003), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
consular-id-cards-mexico-and-beyond, (“Local U.S. police and sheriff departments have been
among the most enthusiastic backers of the consular IDs.”).
182
Verifying Lawful Presence, Tex. Dep’t Pub. Safety 1 (July 2013), https://www.dps.texas.gov/DriverLicense/documents/verifyingLawfulPresence.pdf (“An applicant for a driver
license (DL) or identification card (ID) must present proof of lawful presence in the US.”).
As of August 2017, 12 states and the District of Columbia provided driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants. Forms of Identification for Undocumented Immigrants, Catholic Legal
Immigr. Network, Inc. (Aug. 4, 2017, 11:38 AM), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/forms-identification-undocumented-immigrants.
183
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111. It is important to note here, however, that
immigration attorneys also caution asylum seekers against obtaining a consular ID or passport
because it involves seeking assistance from their government and their claim is based on fear
of persecution by their government.
184
Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115.
185
Ray, supra note 32, at 343.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
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his ICE hold.189 Luckily, Felipe’s cousin bailed him out thirty minutes
before ICE arrived.190 Felipe’s story is probably only one of many, leaving vast uncertainty about whether undocumented immigrants should
carry foreign identification. Based on that uncertainty, a few days after
SB4’s enactment, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) issued a
travel advisory (Travel Advisory), “informing anyone planning to travel
to Texas in the near future to anticipate the possible violation of their
constitutional rights when stopped by law enforcement.”191
Officer Olivarez stated that it is better for the person to have some
form of ID with the person’s name, picture, and birthdate—even if it
is not government issued and just a library card.192 School IDs, state
driver’s licenses, or other IDs that do not show foreign birth or alienage do not help ICE prove their burden.193 Undocumented immigrants
may want to consider obtaining this type of ID, although it may prove
difficult depending on their location. Thus, the type of ID an undocumented immigrant should carry must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. Factors to consider include: looking at the city where the person
lives to determine the types of IDs offered; the characteristics of the
police department in that city to determine how they handle foreign IDs;
the benefits of gaining an officers trust when the person has some form
of ID; the cost of risking further questioning and detention if the person has no form of ID; and the risk of assisting ICE with its burden to
prove alienage.
D. Jails and Detainers

1. Basis for Detainers
As noted in Subpart II.A of this Article, a detainer is a notice to law
enforcement agencies that “ICE intends to assume custody of a removable alien in the [agencies’] custody.”194 ICE detainers do not become
relevant for local law enforcement agencies until someone has been
arrested and charged with a crime—that is, ICE issues detainers only
Id.
Id.
191
Traveling to Texas May Result in Violation of Constitutional Rights, ACLU Warns, ACLU
(May 9, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-issues-texas-travel-advisory.
192
Officer Olivarez Interview, supra note 120.
193
See McWhirter, supra note 180.
194
U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, supra note 21.
189
190
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within the four walls of a detention facility.195 Essentially, ICE detainers
have “nothing to do with patrol.”196
Some officers believe that most people with detainers have committed serious felonies or violent crimes.197 One officer described people
with detainers as those who “aren’t working hard and following the
American Dream,” and instead “want to play by their own rules.”198 But
the data does not show that most people with detainers are felons.
As of Fiscal Year 2017, ICE withholds from the public the basis for
its detainers,199 requiring us to rely on the data from Fiscal Year 2003 to
Fiscal Year 2016. Looking at that data for detainers issued to Texas law
enforcement agencies, 28 percent of detainers were based on offenses
considered aggravated felonies under federal immigration law, and about
7 percent were based on nonaggravated felonies.200 Accordingly, only 35
percent of detainers were based on offenses that constituted felonies
under federal immigration law—meaning that 65 percent were based on
no conviction at all or an offense considered a misdemeanor under federal immigration law (including petty offenses and minor violations of
the law).201 These numbers also align with the data for detainers issued
nationwide during the same time period.202 So overall, most detainers
are not based on felonies.
2. SB4’s Impact on Honored ICE Detainers in Texas
The number of issued detainers has increased substantially under
the Trump Administration. From January 20, 2017 to September 30, 2017,
195

95;

Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126; Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note

196
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111. In fact, Deputy Chief Silva believes that
the “spirit of [SB4] was to address ICE detainers.” Id.
197
Id.; Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115.
198
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
199
Latest Data: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detainers, TRAC Immigr. (July
2017), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/detain [hereinafter Latest Detainer Data].
200
Tracking Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detainers, TRAC Immigr. (last visited Feb. 12, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/detainhistory [hereinafter Tracking
ICE Detainers]. The Author calculated these percentages based on the raw numbers from the
source.
201
Id. For these offense categories, TRAC “utilize[d] the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) coding system maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Where
there are multiple convictions, ICE identified the most serious offense.” About the Data—ICE
Detainers, TRAC Immigr. (last visited Feb. 12, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/
detain/about_data.html.
202
Tracking ICE Detainers, supra note 200.
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ICE issued 112,194 detainers.203 During that same period in 2016, under
the Obama administration, ICE issued only 62,102 detainers.204 The
number of declined detainers between January and September jumped
from 2,267 in 2016 to 7,232 in 2017.205
SB4 is unlikely to drastically change the percentage of honored
ICE detainers in Texas. It is estimated that in 2014 and 2015, local law
enforcement agencies across the United States declined more than
18,000 detainers.206 Only 146 of the 18,000 came from Texas, totaling
less than 1 percent of declined detainers.207 Between Fiscal Year 2003
and Fiscal Year 2017,208 ICE issued 371,026 detainers requests to Texas
law enforcement agencies.209 For about half of the issued detainers, it is
unknown whether the law enforcement agencies declined to honored
them.210 But for the other half for which we have data, law enforcement agencies refused on honor only about .003 percent.211 This means
that most Texas counties regularly honored ICE detainers long before
SB4’s enactment.212
203
Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, U.S. Immigr. and
Customs Enforcement (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/2017.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Morgan Smith & Jay Root, Jails Refused to Hold Thousands of Immigrants Sought
by Feds, Tex. Trib. (Jan. 15, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/01/15/34-texas-counties-declined-hold-deportable-immigra.
207
Id.
208
The data for Fiscal Year 2017 extends only through July 2017. Latest Detainer Data,
supra note 199.
209
Id.
210
Id. TRAC recommends exercising caution when relying on this data:
ICE recorded that the law enforcement agency refused to comply with the ICE I-247 request. TRAC notes that the field ICE uses to track law enforcement agency refusals is not a
required field in ICE’s database. Rather, entry of information is optional. The field is used to
record a variety of different reasons why ICE “lifted”—that is withdrew—a custody transfer
request. These recorded “lift” reasons often disagree with other information ICE records on
whether the individual was actually booked into its custody. For example, ICE sometimes
records an agency refused its transfer request even though ICE records it actually assumed
custody of the individual. Therefore great caution should be exercised when using this information as it may not be reliably recorded by ICE. Id.
211
Id.
212
Officer Martin Interview, supra note 105; Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126;
City of Dallas Complaint in Intervention, supra note 122, at 12; Deputy Chief Silva Interview,
supra note 111; Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115 (EPCSO has “always cooperated
with federal law enforcement.”); First Amended Complaint of San Antonio, supra note 103, at
28.
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Looking specifically at the data ICE has released for Fiscal Year
2016—the year leading up to SB4’s introduction—reveals that the number of honored detainers in Texas did not drop. ICE released data on
about 78 percent of its detainer requests to Texas (specifically, 15,219
detainers).213 Out of those detainer requests, law enforcement agencies
declined to cooperate with less than 1/2 of a percent (or specifically,
59 detainers).214 And 56 of the 59 declined detainers came from Travis County.215 This data presents the following question: Why is SB4 so
important to Texas lawmakers if SB4 would affect less than 1 percent of
detainer requests?
3. Fourth Amendment Concerns
In the ongoing SB4 litigation, plaintiffs argue that SB4’s ICE-detainer provision violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution,216 which protects people from unreasonable searches and
seizures.217 The Fourth Amendment argument appears to boil down to
two issues: (1) whether it is unlawful for a law enforcement agency to
hold a person for 48 hours at ICE’s direction with only an administrative
warrant; and (2) whether SB4 requires law enforcement officers to comply with any detainer request, even those without probable cause.
a. 48-Hour Hold & Administrative Warrants

Without an applicable exception, the Fourth Amendment requires
a warrant to be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate based on an
adequate showing of probable cause in order to seize a person.218 Holding someone based on a detainer request constitutes “a new seizure for
Fourth Amendment purposes.”219 Under the INA, an ICE officer may
arrest any alien in the United States if he has reason to believe that the
alien . . . is in the United States in violation of any . . . law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his
arrest.” But ICE must arrest the alien “without unnecessary delay for
examination before an [ICE officer] having authority to examine aliens
Latest Detainer Data, supra note 199.
Id.
215
Id.
216
Consolidated Plaintiffs El Paso County, et al.’s First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 27, (No. 15:17-cv-404-OLG) (W.D. Tex. June 5, 2017).
217
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
218
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
219
Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2017).
213
214
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as to their right to enter or remain in the United States.220 Although
federal law does not always require ICE to accompany a detainer with a
warrant, ICE’s policy requires it to attach administrative warrants to all
detainers.221 Administrative warrants are forms issued by ICE officers,
which are not signed by a judge or neutral magistrate.222
Currently, the Supreme Court has not provided specific guidance
on whether administrative warrants are constitutional. In Abel v. United
States, the Supreme Court did not specifically address whether an administrative warrant is constitutional because the plaintiff failed to raise it at
trial.223 But the Court acknowledged that since 1798, “[s]tatutes providing for deportation have ordinarily authorized the arrest of deportable
aliens by order of an executive official, . . . [showing an] overwhelming
historical legislative recognition of the propriety of administrative arrest
for deportable aliens.”224 In another case, United States v. Tejada, the First
Circuit decided whether the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure requiring the arresting law enforcement officer to bring the defendant before
a magistrate judge applied to people in immigration detention.225 The
Court held the Rule inapplicable, stating that the INA required only an
examination by an INS (now ICE) officer “without unnecessary delay”
and not an examination by a magistrate.226
In a recent district court case, Roy v. County of Los Angeles, the
district court decided “whether the Fourth Amendment specifically
requires judicial officers to review ICE officers’ probable cause determinations.”227 The district court considered both Abel and Tejada.228 Noting
the distinctions between protections afforded in criminal cases versus
those in civil immigration proceedings, the district court held “that it
is . . . []constitutional under the Fourth Amendment for the Legislature
to delegate a probable cause determination to an executive officer, such
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2016).
U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, supra note 21, at § 2.4.
222
ICE Warrants and Local Authority, Immigrant Legal Resource Ctr. 1 (May 2017),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/ice_warrants_may_2017.pdf.
223
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230–31 (1960).
224
Id. at 233.
225
255 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2001).
226
Id.
227
Roy v. Cty. Of Los Angeles, No. 12-09012, 2017 WL 2559616, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 12,
2017).
228
Id. at *7.
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as an ICE agent, rather than to an immigration, magistrate, or federal
district court judge.”229
In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling, the ongoing SB4 litigation may provide some guidance. In that case, the district court enjoined
SB4’s ICE-Detainer Provision, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to
prevail on their Fourth Amendment challenge.230 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed that preliminary injunction.231 The court found that current
“ICE-detainer request[s] evidence[] probable cause of removability
in every instance” because “[o]n the form, an ICE officer certifies that
probable cause of removability exists.”232 Thus, the court found that “[u]
nder the collective-knowledge doctrine, . . . the ICE officer’s knowledge
may be imputed to local officials even when those officials are unaware
of the specific facts that establish probable cause of removability.”233
Under the collective-knowledge doctrine, the collective knowledge
of two or more officers can satisfy probable cause even if the arresting officer “was unaware of the specific facts that established probable cause.”234
But there must be “some degree of communication between the arresting officer and an officer who has knowledge of all the necessary facts.”235
ICE’s current detainer form notifies the local law enforcement agency
that DHS “has determined that probable cause exists that the [inmate] is a
removable alien.” The ICE officer also checks one of five boxes to further
elaborate on the probable-cause details.236 The detainer form provides at
Id. at *10.
El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F.3d 332, 343 (5th Cir. 2018).
231
Id.
232
El Cenizo, 885 F.3d at 355.
233
Id. The collective-knowledge doctrine has also been applied in another ICE-detainer
case. Mendoza v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 849 F.3d 408, 419
(2017) (“The County employees were entitled to rely on [the ICE officer’s] probable cause
determination.”).
234
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1885).
235
United States v. Ortiz, 781 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Ibarra,
493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007)).
236
Id. The options include the following:
“A final order of removal against the alien;”
“The pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against the alien;”
“Biometric confirmation of the alien’s identity and a records check of federal
databases that affirmatively indicate, by themselves or in addition to other
reliable information, that the alien either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law;”
“Statements made by the alien to an immigration officer and/or other reliable
evidence that affirmatively indicate the alien either lacks immigration status
229
230
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least some degree of communication between the arresting officer—the
local law enforcement officer—and the officer who knows all the necessary
facts—the ICE officer.237 So under the collective-knowledge doctrine (and
assuming that administrative warrants are constitutional), the local law
enforcement agency would have probable cause to detain the individual.
The ICE detainer form also directs the law enforcement agency
to “maintain custody of the alien for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48
HOURS” after the county would release that person under the county
charge (essentially, when the county would release the person but for
the detainer).238 Critics, however, argue that the Fourth Amendment
has no 48-hour exception.239 But if ICE’s probable cause determination
is imputed onto the local law enforcement agency through the collective-knowledge doctrine, no 48-hour exception is necessary.
b. Detainer Requests Without Probable Cause

The second question SB4 raises in the Fourth Amendment context is:
Does SB4 require law enforcement officers to comply with any detainer
request, even those without probable cause? SB4 requires a law enforcement agency to “comply with, honor, and fulfill any request made in [a]
detainer request” from ICE. Reading the text literally, SB4 would require
law enforcement agencies to honor detainer requests lacking probable
cause. Honoring a detainer in that situation could violate the Fourth
Amendment and thus lead to liability for the law enforcement agency.
SB4’s challengers argued that SB4’s ICE-Detainer Provision was facially
invalid because “it does not expressly require a probable cause determination[,] [and] ICE policy may change.”240 The Fifth Circuit, however,
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, reasoning that this argument confirmed
that facial relief was inappropriate: “If ICE policy changes or if violations
occur, the proper mechanism is an as-applied, not a facial challenge.”241
or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law[;]”
“Upon completion of the proceeding or investigation for which the alien was
transferred to your custody, DHS intends to resume custody of the alien to
complete processing and/or make an admissibility determination.”
237
Ortiz, 781 F.3d at 228.
238
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 26 (emphasis in original).
239
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, ICE’s New Immigration Detainer Policy Remains
Legally Flawed (Mar. 24, 2017, 3:38 PM), http://crimmigration.com/2017/03/24/ices-new-immigration-detainer-policy-remains-legally-flawed.
240
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Also, for some police departments, a warrant accompanying
a detainer is very important. For example, since January 2017, Bexar
County Sheriff’s Office has requested that ICE attach a warrant, whether
administrative or judicial, to every detainer request.242 For Bexar County, a warrant signals that ICE has done its due diligence to ensure that a
person is removable. If ICE issues a detainer without an accompanying
warrant, Bexar County’s policy is that it will not honor it.
Different police departments have different ways of dealing with
detainers. For example, in Bexar County, the county immediately notifies ICE when the county plans to release a person with a pending
detainer.243 If ICE fails to take custody of the suspect within 48 hours,
local law enforcement officers will release the individual. Deputy Chief
Silva, however, indicated that in Bexar County, ICE typically takes
custody of the individual within a few hours.244 In Tarrant County, the
sheriff’s office is hoping to eventually obtain a judicial warrant approved
by a judge with each detainer request, rather than just an administrative
warrant.245 Obtaining a judicial warrant would allow Tarrant County to
avoid constitutional challenges to continued detention without a warrant.246 Also, for the last sixteen years, Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office
has had two on-duty ICE agents in its jails Monday through Friday from
about 7 p.m. to 10 p.m.247
Some local police departments remain unconcerned about possibly
being sued for honoring a detainer request.248 Bexar County Sheriff’s
Office, which was sued in the past over an honored ICE detainer request,
is also confident that its current processes will protect against any future
litigation.249 In Santoya v. United States,, Bexar County Sheriff’s Office
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
244
Id.
245
Officer Martin Interview, supra note 105.
246
For cases challenging administrative warrants, see Roy, 2017 WL 2559616, at *9;
247
Id.; see Jack Fink, Tarrant County Jail, 17 Others in Texas Ink Deal with ICE, CBS DFW
(July 31, 2017, at 9:15 PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2017/07/31/tarrant-county-jail-17-otherstexas-ink-deal-with-ice (“Currently, ICE has agents inside the jails doing the job between
Monday and Friday.”). This may appear to raise a Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering
issue. But because Tarrant County is voluntarily allowing ICE into its jails, the federal government is unlikely commandeering any state recourses.
248
Officer Olivarez Interview, supra note 120; Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111;
Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126; Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115.
249
Santoyo v. United States, No. 5:16-CV-855-OLG, 2017 WL 2896021 (W.D. Tex. June 5,
2017); Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
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held a man pursuant to a detainer request for about forty days—well
over the 48-hour maximum—after his county case was dismissed, effectively ending the county’s custody.250 Now, when ICE issues a detainer
request for an inmate, Bexar County flags that person and closely tracks
their county case to ensure that the county does not hold that person
beyond the 48-hour maximum.251
E. Officers’ Reputations Within Their Communities

Officers are aware that SB4 has impacted their relationships with
local communities,252 but some believe this is due to misinformation
about what SB4 actually permits local law enforcement to do.253 In Commander Lara’s opinion, to understand this issue, it is important to first
understand immigrants’ histories. Law enforcement in the immigrants’
native countries are often ruthless and corrupt, so people come to the
United States with fears of law enforcement officers. And most of these
people have sacrificed a lot to come to the United States, for example,
by using their whole life savings to pay someone to help them cross the
border. If someone slightly distrusts law enforcement officers, that person will not risk everything to help the officers solve a crime.254 So it
essentially comes down to trust, which was a reoccurring theme during
interviews with Texas law enforcement departments.
In order to effectively engage with immigrant communities, it is
imperative that local law enforcement support transparency policies and
effectively communicate their role in immigration-law enforcement.255
One way local law enforcement agencies have accomplished this goal is
Santoya, 2017 WL 2896021, at *1; Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
252
Officer Olivarez Interview, supra note 120 (stating that SB4 has definitely had an impact
on people in Houston, which has a lot of minority communities); Officer Martin Interview, supra note 105; Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126; Dianne Solis, North Texas Police
Officers Try to Ease Fear Among Immigrants over SB4, Dall. News (Aug. 17, 2017), https://
www.dallasnews.com/news/immigration/2017/08/17/north-texas-police-officers-try-ease-fearamong-immigrants-senate-bill-4 (“[SB4] has already hurt our trust . . . . We already have a lot
of fear out there because of [SB4]. It has already created damage.”); City of Dallas Complaint
in Intervention, supra note 122, at 13 (“The fear caused by SB4 will undermine Dallas’s ongoing efforts to promote community policing and to develop trust and cooperation in neighborhoods with large immigrant populations.”).
253
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111; Officer Martin Interview, supra note 105;
Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126.
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Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115.
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through community outreach programs. Each department interviewed
administered their own version of a community outreach program, each
of which varied in approach.
Deputy Chief Alaniz stated that he has personally participated in
community forums in Arlington, Texas to address misinformation and
fear surrounding SB4.256 In a three-week timeframe, about 1,000 people
attended Arlington Police Department’s community forums.257 Deputy
Chief Alaniz stated that his department has a long track record of engaging immigrant communities and suggests that some trust already existed
between the community and the police.
Deputy Chief Silva has personally been in communication with
the consulate offices in Mexico and Guatemala and other organizations
that support the immigrant community.258 Bexar County Sheriff’s Office
wants these consulate offices and other organizations to tell victims and
witnesses that there is no reason to be afraid or to hide and that the
department can help them with the necessary documents to gain legal
status if they are a qualifying victim or witness (discussed in Subpart
II.B).259 Bexar County Sheriff’s Office also holds town hall meetings
where Deputy Chief Silva gives presentations in Spanish.260
Commander Lara, who personally testified at a Texas Senate
hearing on SB4, stated that the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office must
do extensive outreach to ensure that the community understands what
SB4 does and does not permit.261 Because SB4 has received substantial
media attention, the sheriff’s office was worried that SB4 would inhibit its
relationship with the community.262 But in Commander Lara’s opinion,
SB4 has not caused fear within his local community yet, likely because
the sheriff’s office reiterates to the community that it is “not [there] to
enforce immigration law.”263
At a community meeting in Fort Worth, Officer Rodriguez and the
neighborhood’s community police officer handed out SB4 brochures.264
Deputy Chief Alaniz Interview, supra note 126.
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258
Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111.
259
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The brochure explains SB4 and its effect on police officers’ roles. The
brochure explains that SB4 does not require officers assist or cooperate
with federal immigration authorities SB4 in places of worship and defines
all relevant SB4 terms. Officer Rodriguez also answered any questions
about SB4 in both Spanish and English. He reassured the community
that “FWPD is here to help” and encouraged people to call the police
if an officer mistreated them.265 He also reiterated that everyone in the
community personally pays for Forth Worth Police Department’s services
through the Crime Control and Prevention District (CCPD) funding.266
In Houston, Officer Olivarez’s267 unit spearheaded a program called
Alianza Against Crime, which takes place in Houston’s East End—a
predominantly Hispanic area. This initiative has three main parts: (1) a
Town Hall Forum, which allows people to ask questions directly to local
law enforcement officers and aims to make people more comfortable
and open with police; (2) a Resource Fair, where civic organizations set
up booths to answer questions and provide information; and (3) a Police
Display, which includes interactive demonstrations of police department
equipment.268 After conducting the community events, the department
saw an increase in calls to the police from immigrant communities.
In addition to the diverse approaches discussed above, police departments should also consider using social media creatively. For example,
Officer Olivarez received a sponsor for Android tablets to conduct surveys
at the Alianza events.269 He stated that 50 percent of the Spanish-speaking
people who responded to his survey found out about the Houston Police
Department’s events via social media. In February 2017, Officer Rodriguez
posted a nearly six-minute video to his personal Facebook about SB4 to
help soothe the fears of Fort Worth’s immigrant community.270 In Spanish,
Officer Rodriguez at Community Meeting, supra note 108.
CCPD, Fort Worth Police Dep’t, http://www.fortworthpd.com/CCPD. CCPD funding
gives 1/2 of a cent of the sales tax from every purchase in Fort Worth to the police department.
Id. During the community meeting, Officer Rodriguez stated: “The next time you see a police
car, look at the back bumper. It says CCPD funded, meaning that you pay for that car . . . with
your sales taxes.” Officer Rodriguez at Community Meeting, supra note 108.
267
Officer Olivarez stated that he loves his job and building relationships with people in
the community. He just completed his masters and is looking at a PhD program in community
policing.
268
Officer Olivarez Interview, supra note 120; Law Enforcement Spotlight: Houston Alianza Against Crime, COPS, U.S. DOJ (July 2017), https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/07-2017/
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269
Officer Olivarez Interview, supra note 120.
270
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he reinforced that Fort Worth officers are not federal officials that enforce
immigration law. With 1.7 million views of the video, Officer Rodriguez
has received both praise and criticism.271 Officer Rodriguez believes that
officers need to market both their badges and themselves; the media will
not report on the officers’ good deeds, so the department must take it into
their own hands and do it themselves via social media.272
F.

Training on Immigration Law

Officer training on immigration law is a practice that varies among
departments. SB4’s opponents argue that “[i]mmigration law is a complex field and requires special training to administer”—something local
law enforcement officers do not have.273 Some departments interviewed
for this Article indicated that immigration-law training is unnecessary.274
But other departments interviewed indicated that they plan to provide
immigration-law training.275
In the absence of a § 287(g) agreement, police officers (depending on
their jurisdiction) may not have required immigration-law training. Under
§ 287(g) agreements, “ICE provides a four-week basic training program and
a one-week refresher training program (completed every two years)” on
immigration law.276 That training makes sense because § 287(g) agreements
authorize police officers to enforce immigration law “in relation to the
investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States.”277
Under SB4—and in the absence of an operational § 287(g) agreement—
local law enforcement officers are not authorized to enforce immigration
law and are prohibited from making unilateral decisions about a person’s
immigration status. Therefore, training in immigration-law enforcement
daniel.segura.9406/videos/1515060968511895.
271
Diane Smith, Officer Makes Video to Soothe Immigrants; Mayor, Police Say He’s Speaking for Himself, Star-Telegram (Feb. 2, 2017, 1:51 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/
local/community/fort-worth/article130355404.html.
272
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106.
273
Application for Preliminary Injunction, Declaration of Vanita Gupta at 2, City of El
Cenizo v. Texas, (W.D. Tex. June 5, 2017) (No. 15:17-cv-404-OLG); First Amended Complaint
of San Antonio, supra note 103, at 30 (“Rep[resentative] Geren . . . admitted that local police
officers have no skills or training to determine immigration status.”).
274
Officer Rodriguez Interview, supra note 106; Chief Martin Interview, supra note 105;
Commander Lara Interview, supra note 115 (stating that the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office
would not be providing immigration-law training because the sheriff’s office is attempting to
keep its operations as consistent as possible with how they were before SB4’s enactment).
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Deputy Chief Silva Interview, supra note 111; Officer Olivarez Interview, supra note 120.
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Delegation of Immigration Authority, supra note 21.
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for officers not engaged in the kind of enforcement authorized by § 287(g)
agreements is likely unnecessary under SB4 alone.278
G. Resource Reallocation and the Tenth Amendment

SB4’s opponents argue that SB4 will require local law enforcement agencies to reallocate their resources to comply with SB4.279 When
Texas lawmakers first announced SB4, El Paso County Sheriff’s Office
was concerned about having to use its local resources for immigration
enforcement.280 But so far, Commander Lara believes this has not been
a problem and that the sheriff’s office will not have to reallocate its
resources to comply with SB4.281 Commander Lara did note, however, that departments that did not previously comply with ICE detainers
may have to reallocate their resources. Bexar County Sheriff’s Office
will also not have to reallocate its resources; for them it is “business as
usual.”282 And Officer Martin also denied that Tarrant County Sheriff’s
Office will have to reallocate resources.283 In fact, the Tarrant County
Sheriff submitted an affidavit on behalf of the State claiming that SB4 is
actually cost saving because it enables him to “release inmate[s] subject
to ICE detainers up to seven days early if [the County] is releasing them
into federal custody.”284
SB4’s challengers argued that SB4 violates the Tenth Amendment, which prohibits the federal government from commandeering
state resources to enforce immigration law (because immigration is the
federal government’s responsibility).285 This is why detainers are simply
278
But if police departments are assisting undocumented immigrants in securing U or T visas, officers will need some immigration training to identify who qualifies for those protections.
279
City of Dallas Complaint in Intervention, supra note 122, at 14 (“SB4 will require a
re-allocation of the already limited, stretched, and strained resources of the Dallas Police
Department. Resources will need to be diverted as to whatever immigration law training is
permitted. Local governments will be required to comply with any ICE request to assist and
cooperate including providing enforcement assistance. Dallas will no longer have discretion to
decline assistance and cooperation. A refusal because resources are demanded elsewhere may
trigger a complaint by ICE or someone else to the Texas Attorney General.”).
280
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281
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282
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283
Officer Martin Interview, supra note 105.
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Defendants’ Response to Applications for Preliminary Injunction, Declaration of Bill E.
Waybourn at 4, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, (W.D. Tex. June 23, 2017) (No. 15:17-cv-404-OLG).
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New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political
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requests and not demands. If they were demands, they would almost
certainly be unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment.
SB4, however, is a state law that instructs state and local law enforcement agencies to cooperate with the federal government. Nothing in
SB4 constitutes action by the federal government that commandeers
state resources. As the Fifth Circuit stated in dicta in the pending SB4
litigation, the plaintiffs were “merely recast[ing] a state-law home-rulecity argument as a hybrid Tenth Amendment and preemption claim.”286
Thus, even if state and local law enforcement agencies (subdivisions of
the state) reallocated their resources to comply with SB4, those actions
would not violate the Tenth Amendment. In other words, “[f]or better
or for worse, Texas can ‘commandeer’ its municipalities in this way.”287
III. Is SB4 Effective?
SB4 has cost Texas—therefore its taxpayers—a lot of money. Vast
legislative resources were used to enact SB4, and Texas lawmakers
almost certainly knew that SB4—a controversial bill—would lead to
lengthy litigation, with taxpayers footing the bill.288 This knowledge is
demonstrated by Texas’s Attorney General Ken Paxton filing a preemptive law suit before SB4’s effective date, seeking a declaration that SB4
was constitutional.289 Thomas Saenz, the president and general counsel
for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, criticized Texas lawmakers, stating, “It’s an open checkbook and there are
going to be lots of [law]suits . . . . Why a fiscally conservative governor
and legislature would write a check like that is the untold story.”290
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”); De Canas v. Bica, 424
U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal
power.”).
286
El Cenizo, 885 F.3d at 359. “In Texas, a Home Rule city . . . can pass any regulations or
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Home Rule, City of Ctr. Tex., http://www.centertexas.org/city-council/home-rule (last visited
May 7, 2018).
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In addition to the cost and resources spent on SB4, a significant
amount of negative attention followed SB4’s enactment. SB4 has led to
serious concerns of racial profiling by local law enforcement. And until
SB4 is enforced in practice, we cannot know for certain that SB4 will not
lead to racial profiling. But SB4 may well embolden some officers to
engage in racial profiling even though SB4 does not explicitly sanction
it. SB4 has also caused some victims and witnesses not to come forward
to police due to fears of deportation.291 This means that criminals are
escaping punishment and victims are not receiving the treatment and
protection they might need. SB4 has also significantly damaged police
officers’ reputations within their local communities, causing them to
expend time and resources on extra community outreach, even in the
law enforcement agencies claiming that they do not need to reallocate
their resources to comply with SB4’s requirements alone.
Because of the amount of money and resources used to enact and
defend SB4, combined with its various negative effects, one would think
that SB4 would have a big impact on Texas residents’ safety, which was,
according to Governor Abbott, the primary reason for passing SB4.292
But that does not appear to be the case. The extremely small number
of declined detainers leave little to no room for SB4 to greatly increase
safety. Thus, we must ask: Was SB4 the best use of resources for Texas
lawmakers to improve its residents’ safety?
In light of the mounting litigation costs, Texas lawmakers should
have considered other alternatives to improving resident safety.
Although there is significant data showing that undocumented immigrants are not a safety risk to U.S. citizens, that argument is beyond this
Article’s scope. Thus, assuming arguendo that Texas lawmakers’ safety
concerns are genuine, one alternative to SB4 is more aggressive enforcement of laws prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented workers.
According to John Connolly, the former executive associate director
of Homeland Security Investigations in Washington, D.C., the pull for
illegal immigration is that people can come to the United States, buy a
Social Security card and other documents at a relatively small cost, get
a job, and get paid.293 “If [people] are told, ‘Look, don’t come here anySee supra discussion in Subpart II.B.
See, e.g., Texas Bans Sanctuary Cities, supra note 66.
293
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291
292
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more, [the United States is] enforcing the laws, you can’t get jobs,’ people
aren’t going to make th[e] expens[ive] and . . . long journey to come here
to the United States.”294
But Texas’s attempts at implementing electronic employment verification (E-Verify) have been weak at best. In 2014, the Texas legislature
passed a bill requiring “E-Verify only for employees directly working for
[the] state government.”295 Even then, the Texas legislature never gave
the Texas Work Commission, the agency tasked with enforcing E-Verify
rules, the power to enforce the requirements.296 Accordingly, Texas businesses continue benefiting from undocumented immigrants’ cheap labor
without any fear of punishment.297 And at the same time, Texas is spending millions on SB4 that has little potential for the change that Texas
lawmakers claim we need. In other words, if Texas lawmakers are truly
concerned with resident safety, they chose a fairly ineffective method of
increasing safety.
Although the interviews with Texas police departments are purely
anecdotal, their reactions to SB4 further support the point that SB4 may
be highly ineffective. Some departments feel that immigration-law training for officers and resource reallocation to comply with SB4 are both
unnecessary.298 If SB4 were changing the role of local police departments,
both training and resource reallocation would be necessary. Moreover,
prior to the enactment of SB4, only a very few number of local departments failed to honor detainer requests.299 Even if SB4 is not completely
ineffective, however, the negative effects far outweigh the positive ones.
Texas residents must ask whether the true purpose of SB4 was
their safety or was it to take a strong stance on immigration while
“hammer[ing]”300 the few counties that occasionally declined ICE
detainer requests.
lawmakers-go-easy-employers-undocumented-workers.
294
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Conclusion
Although not all Texas law enforcement agencies were willing to
discuss SB4, this Article seeks to reinforce the power of conversation.
Understanding the stance of police officers—caught in the middle of
SB4’s politics and legal arguments—is critical. As Justice Kennedy said
in Arizona v. United States (the SB 1070 case), immigration-law conversations require “thoughtful, rational civic discourse.”301
Unfortunately, we cannot determine whether SB4 will lead to racial
profiling based on conversation alone. And neither SB 1070 in practice
nor the Court’s decision in Arizona provide much guidance. But one
essential lesson from conversations with Texas police officers is that SB4
likely serves no purpose at all. The small percentage of declined detainer requests in Texas leave little to no room for SB4 to have any great
impact. Among the 254 Texas counties, only a few regularly declined
detainers. The question becomes: was SB4 worth it?
SB4—a controversial bill—created significant disruption. SB4 hurt
police officers’ reputations within their local communities, causing them
to expend a significant amount of time and resources on extra community outreach. SB4 also caused some victims and witnesses to fear coming
forward to police and raised valid racial-profiling concerns. Texas lawmakers, ignoring these concerns, used vast resources and money to enact
SB4 and now to defend it in court. Overall, it appears that during SB4’s
enactment, something other than “resident safety” was at play.

301

Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416.

112

